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Kansas and Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Applies the Illinois Brick Rule to Regulated Utilities
Although Congress has charged the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) with primary responsibility for enforcing the federal
antitrust laws,1 it also has authorized, in section four of the Clayton Act, a pri-
vate right of action. Section four provides that:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.2
Many authorities believe that private actions have yielded substantial bene-
fits in the form of enhanced oversight and enforcement, and compensation for
persons wronged by anticompetitive behavior? Others, however, point to exces-
sive costs, complexity, and a widespread belief that many treble damage suits are
brought merely to acquire a settlement based on nuisance value or to harm one's
competitors. 4 Regardless of the efficacy of private actions, they continue to con-
stitute a substantial component of antitrust enforcement. Recent studies demon-
strate that the vast majority of antitrust suits are brought by private parties,
rather than by the government.5
In adjudicating claims under section four of the Clayton Act, courts have
drawn a distinction between plaintiffs who are "direct purchasers," that is, par-
ties who bought price-fixed goods or services directly from one of the conspira-
tors, and "indirect purchasers," those who bought further down the distribution
chain. 6 The United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois7 de-
clared that, except in certain narrow circumstances, indirect purchasers lack
standing to sue under section four.8 The Illinois Brick Court offered several
1. ABA ANTrrRUST SECTION, ANTrriUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 385 (2d ed. 1984).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
3. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar ofAntitrust, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 168-
69 (1958). Loevinger points out that governmental enforcement focuses on punitive sanctions rather
than compensating victims. Id. Thus, private actions may result in outcomes more compatible with
the antitrust laws' primary goals, which are to deter future illegality, compensate victims, and ensure
that violators disgorge their ill-gotten gains. Blue Shield v. McReady, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
4. See Turner, Private Antitrust Enforcement: Policy Recommendations, in PRIVATE ANTI-
TRUST LITIGATION 407, 407 (L. White ed. 1988).
5. See ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 178, Table C-2 (1987) (published with REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)).
6. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1663 (1989); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720, 724 (1977). To illustrate, assume that A conspires illegally with other producers
to raise prices of the product that A manufactures and sells. B then purchases some of these over-
priced products from A and in turn resells them to C. B would be a "direct purchaser" and C would
be an "indirect purchaser."
7. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
8. Id. at 736.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
policy reasons for creating this limitation: (1) a desire to avoid the complex
analysis necessary to establish the amount of an overcharge borne by various
parties in a distribution chain; (2) a fear that defendants might face multiple
liability; and (3) a concern that dividing the damage award among multiple
plaintiffs would so reduce any individual recovery that future claimants would
be discouraged from pursuing valid claims.9
The Illinois Brick decision has generated considerable controversy and in-
terest in the academic community.10 Most of the commentary has focused on
situations involving actors in competitive markets. However, when the direct
purchaser does not operate in a free market but is instead a regulated utility,
some of the policy concerns underlying the Illinois Brick rule change. The
United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Kansas v. Utilicorp United,
Inc.,11 re-examined its standing rules in this new context. The Utilicorp Court
reaffimed its commitment to Illinois Brick by extending the standing limitation
to situations involving a direct purchaser in a regulated industry. 12
This Note, after presenting the factual background of Utilicorp and a brief
summary of the seminal cases addressing direct purchaser standing, will discuss
some of the concerns raised by various commentators and evaluate their applica-
bility to the regulatory context of Utilicorp. It then will examine two areas of
the standing issue clarified in Utilicorp. The Note concludes that the majority's
decision to adhere to the Illinois Brick rule, despite a troubling lack of precedent
to support some of its assertions, best promotes the antitrust laws' goals of deter-
rence, compensation, and disgorgement of wrongfully obtained profits.
The claim in Utilicorp arose out of an alleged conspiracy to inflate natural
gas prices. 13 Defendants in the action included three companies and two limited
9. Id. at 737-47. For a detailed discussion of Illinois Brick, see infra text accompanying notes
102-15.
10. See Bares, Fanelli, Gordon & Murphy, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indl-
rect Purchaser in Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. Rnv. 309 (1978); Benston, Indirect Purchas-
ers' Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of
Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule, 55 ANTrrRusT LJ. 213 (1986); Carrafiello, A Searchfor
Symmetry: The 'Pass On'Issue in Quest of Determination, 24 ANTrmusT BULL. 187 (1979); Cava-
naugh, Illinois Brick Revisited: An Analysis of a Developing Antitrust Jurisprudence, 17 VAL. U.L.
REv. 63 (1983); Dunfee, Privity in Antitrust: Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 107 (1978);
Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 269 (1980); Kamp, Monopsonistic Price Fixing and Umbrella Pricing as a Theory of
Antitrust Standing: A New View of Illinois Brick, 50 U. CiN. L. REv. 52 (1981); Landes & Posner,
Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis
of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CI. L. REv. 602 (1979) [hereinafter Should Indirect Purchasers
Have Standing]; Landes & Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980); Mantell, Denial ofa Forum to Indirect-Purchaser Victims ofPrice
Fixing Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PACE L. REv. 153 (1982);
Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom: Illinois Brick and the 'Pass-On' Problem, 9
ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REV., no. 4, at 69 (1977).
11. I10 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
12. Id.at2811. ,
13. In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 695 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (1988), aff'd, 866
F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990),
For the sake of clarity, this case is referred to in the text as Utilicorp even when discussing the case at
the district court and appeals court levels. When citing to the district court or appeals court opin-
ions in footnotes, the title Wyoming Sands is used.
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partnerships that produced natural gas from the Wyoming Tight Sands Forma-
tion in Wyoming, and an interstate pipeline operator. 14 Among the plaintiffs
were three investor-owned public utilities that had purchased gas directly from
the pipeline, and the States of Kansas and Missouri, whose attorneys general
asserted claims in aparens patriae capacity on behalf of all residential customers
who had purchased gas from the utilities. 15 Plaintiffs brought the action pursu-
ant to section four of the Clayton Act and sought treble damages for the
overcharge. 16
The defendants claimed that the public utilities, despite the fact that they
were direct purchasers, nonetheless lacked standing because they supposedly
had raised their own prices to offset the illegal overcharge and thus had suffered
no damage. 17 The utilities' customers, the defendants argued, had borne the
entire cost of the overcharge and were, therefore, the proper parties to the ac-
tion. 18 The district court rejected this argument, relying on Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.19 Although the direct pur-
chasers in Utilicorp were regulated utilities, rather than members of a competi-
tive market, the standing limitation formulated in Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick was applicable nonetheless. 20 Because only direct purchasers could pur-
sue the claim, the parens patriae claims had to be dismissed.2 1
In reaching its decision, the district court also relied on a recent Seventh
Circuit case, Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.22 In
Panhandle Eastern, the State of Illinois sought to represent customers of a regu-
lated gas distributor that had purchased natural gas at prices inflated because of
antitrust violations.2 3 The Seventh Circuit dismissed the claim, holding that
Illinois Brick barred claims by indirect purchasers unless they fell within one of
two narrow exceptions to this general rule.24 The court refused to adopt an
expansive interpretation of these exceptions: "Illinois Brick did not ... leave it
14. Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1111.
15. The attorneys general also were bringing claims on behalf of state agencies, municipalities,
and other political subdivisions that had purchased gas directly from the pipeline. Id. at 1112.
16. Id. For a chart showing all of the various plaintiffs and defendants in this complex litiga-
tion, see id. at 1119.
17. Id. at 1112.
18. Id.
19. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, the defendants similarly argued that the claims of
the direct purchaser plaintiff should be dismissed because it allegedly had passed on any overcharge
to its customers. The Hanover Shoe Court rejected this argument, holding that direct purchasers
were proper parties to an action even if they had passed on the entire overcharge. Id. at 489. For a
detailed discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
20. The district court acknowledged that "Et]he fact that the alleged antitrust activity took
place in the context of a public utility direct purchaser renders inapplicable much of the rationale
behind the decisions in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe." Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1114-15.
Nonetheless, the standing limitations espoused. in those cases had to be applied here, as the rule was
intended to be "as pervasive as possible." Id. at 1115.
21. Id. at 1118.
22. 839 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir.), withdrawn, aff'd in part, rev'd in part upon rehearing, 852 F.2d
891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
23. Id. at 1207.
24. Id. at 1210. Dictum in Illinois Brick stated that indirect purchasers may be allowed stand-
ing in certain narrow instances. These exceptions are discussed infra in note 31, and in texts accom-
panying notes 113-15, 129-35.
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to the discretion of the lower courts to expand the exceptions to include situa-
tions [merely] within some range of approximation of the exceptions defined in
Illinois Brick."'25
Soon thereafter, however, the Seventh Circuit withdrew its holding in Pan.
handle Eastern and granted a motion for rehearing.26 Based on this develop-
ment, the district court judge in Utilicorp granted a request by the attorneys
general of Kansas and Missouri for interlocutory appellate review of the stand-
ing issue.27 The district judge certified the following question to the Tenth
Circuit:
In a private antitrust action under 15 U.S.C. § 15 involving claims of
price fixing against the producers of natural gas, is a State a proper
plaintiff as parens patriae for its citizens who paid inflated prices for
natural gas, when the lawsuit already includes as plaintiffs those public
utilities who paid the inflated prices upon direct purchase from the
producers and who subsequently passed on most or all of the price
increase to the citizens of the State?28
Before the Tenth Circuit heard this appeal, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed in part its earlier decision in Panhandle Eastern.29 Judge Posner,
writing for a five-judge plurality on a ten-judge panel, stated that the regulated
gas distributor, which was the direct purchaser, had passed on all of the over-
charge, pursuant to a contract requiring it to do so. 3 0 Therefore, the indirect
purchasers had standing under the so-called "cost-plus contract exception."3 1
The Tenth Circuit in Utilicorp refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing.3 2 The court first noted that in Panhandle Eastern only one regulated com-
pany sought relief, while in the case subjudice three utilities claimed damages.33
25. Panhandle E, 839 F.2d at 1210.
26. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 892 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
27. Wyoming Sands, 695 F. Supp. at 1120.
28. Id.
29. See Panhandle R, 852 F.2d at 899. For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 118-28.
30. 852 F.2d at 894. "Pass-through" clauses are now very common in public utility regulatory
schemes. See Hammond, An Overview of Electric Utility Regulation, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREG-
ULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 46 (J. Moorhouse ed. 1986). They also are referred to as
"flow-through" provisions, "price adjustment mechanisms," and other variations as well,
31. See Panhandle E, 852 F.2d at 898-99. The "cost-plus exception" to the direct purchaser
rule devolves from dicta in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick stating that indirect purchasers "might"
have standing to assert an antitrust claim in situations in which the direct purchaser has passed on
the entire overcharge to the indirect purchaser pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract. See
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). In such instances, the direct purchaser would not suffer any cogni-
zable injury because: (1) any overcharge resulting from the illegal behavior would pass through to
the buyer as required by the contract; and (2) the direct purchaser would not suffer any loss of sales
because the buyer(s) would be obligated to purchase the amount agreed to in the contract. See
generally Comment, A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Cost-Plus Contract Exception in Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 743, 752-53 (1980) (applying techniques of economic
analysis to explain the absence of injury to the direct purchaser and to evaluate the cost-plus
exception).
32. See In re Wyoming Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286, 1293 (10th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
nom. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
33. Id. at 1292.
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Not all of these operated under fuel-price adjustment clauses as did the utility in
Panhandle Eastern.34 Thus, the issue of whether the utilities had passed on all
of the overcharge was an unresolved question of fact.35 The Tenth Circuit
stated further that even a complete pass-through would not bring the facts
within the cost-plus exception,3 6 as Judge Posner had asserted in Panhandle
Eastern.3 7 The cost-plus doctrine, claimed the Tenth Circuit, applied only when
the indirect purchasers were contractually bound to purchase a fixed quantity of
the item fixed by contract; no such agreement was present between the utilities
and residential consumers. 38 Because the exception was inapplicable, the gen-
eral rule prohibiting indirect purchaser standing controlled. The Tenth Circuit
thus disregarded the Seventh Circuit's holding in Panhandle Eastern and upheld
the district court's dismissal of the parens patriae claims.39
To resolve this conflict between the two circuits,4° the United States
Supreme Court granted the states' petition for certiorari.4 In a five to four deci-
sion, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding.42 Writing for the major-
ity,43 Justice Kennedy began by rejecting the petitioners' argument that indirect
purchaser standing should be allowed in cases involving a regulated utility that
has passed on one hundred percent of the overcharge to its customers. 44 Even if
a utility raises its rates to offset fully the cost increase, it still may have suffered
an injury by the overcharge:
"The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase
does not show that the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged.
His customers may have been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise
is merely the occasion for a price increase a businessman could have
imposed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that he was earlier not
enjoying the benefits of the higher price should not permit the [wrong-
doer].., to take those benefits from him .... This statement merely
recognizes the usual principle that the possessor of a right can recover
for its unlawful deprivation whether or not he was previously exercis-
ing it."'45
Because of this concern, an indirect purchaser, to prove that the utilities had not
incurred any damage from the overcharge, would have to demonstrate that the
utilities could not have raised prices had there been no increase in fuel cost.4 6
34. Id. at 1292-93 & n.2.
35. Id. at 1293.
36. See id.
37. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 893 (7th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
38. Wyoming Sands, 866 F.2d at 1292.
39. Id. at 1294.
40. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that its reason for hearing the Utilicorp case was "to
resolve a conflict between this decision and ... Panhandle Eastern." Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2811
(citation omitted).
41. Kansas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 833 (1990).
42. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2810.
43. Joining the majority were Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
44. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2812-13.
45. Id. (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 n.9 (1968)).
46. Id.
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Such a demonstration would require evidence that prevailing market conditions
would not have permitted a price hike or evidence that state regulators would
have rejected a rate increase.47 Allowing indirect purchasers to attempt such a
showing would necessitate delving into the intricacies of economic analysis or
state regulatory law, all to ascertain a fact wholly unrelated to the defendants'
liability.48 Even if an indirect purchaser succeeded in proving this fact, the utili-
ties still would have incurred nominal losses in the form of decreased earnings
during the so-called "lag period," 49 and the apportionment problem would re-
main.50 The Court stated that these complexities need not be incurred to secure
compensation for residential consumers; if the utilities prevailed in the litigation,
state regulators likely would require them to pass on a portion of the amount
recovered to their customers.5 1
Justice Kennedy then focused on the potential problems that would ensue if
parens patriae actions were permitted on behalf of indirect purchasers.52 The
states, noted the Court, had authority to represent only residential customers.
5 3
Industrial and nonresident users would have to fend for themselves. Many of
these unrepresented parties would intervene in the action, making the suit un-
manageable and raising the possibility of error.5 4 The Court concluded that
"'even if ways could be found to bring all potential plaintiffs together in one
huge action, the complexity thereby introduced into treble-damages proceedings
argues strongly for retaining the Hanover Shoe rule.' ,,55
The Court next rejected the petitioners' assertion that the utilities, having
passed on the cost of the overcharge, would lack incentive to pursue the claim.5 6
The majority noted that state utility commissions have broad discretionary pow-
ers under most state regulatory schemes and might forbid a utility from passing
on the costs of the overcharge if it failed to pursue a valid claim.57 Moreover, if
the utility sued and won, it would net a sizeable recovery, even after refunding
the overcharge amount to its customers.5 8 Justice Kennedy concluded by citing
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2814. The "lag period" refers to the time from when the antitrust violator raises the
price of the gas sold to the utility to the time when the utility is able to offset this increase by raising
its prices. During this period the utility will be paying higher prices for fuel while charging the
same pre-overcharge price to customers for its service. Thus, the utility's profits per unit will drop
until it clears the necessary bureaucratic hurdles. See generally, M. SCHMIDT, AUTOMATIC ADJuST-
MENT CLAUSES: THEORY AND APPLICATION 7-8 (1980) (discussing the lag period concept).
50. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2814.
51. Id. at 2814-15.
52. See id. at 2815.
53. Id. The enabling statute reads, in relevant part: "Any attorney general of a State may
bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing
in such State." 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
54. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 1215.
55. Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731 n.ll (1977)).
56. See id. at 2816.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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past instances of diligent claim enforcement by utilities.59
The Court then addressed the issue of deterrence. Allowing indirect pur-
chaser standing, stated the majority, may hamper private antitrust enforcement
because most retail customers lack the expertise and experience necessary to
detect a price-fixing conspiracy. 6° Even if they did discover illegal behavior, the
small individual amounts at stake probably would be insufficient to entice retail
customers into enduring the inconveniences of prolonged litigation.61 More-
over, parens patriae actions would not solve these difficulties because the en-
abling statute affords only limited representation 62 and because states' attorneys
general may be hesitant to pursue smaller, more speculative claims.63
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the rationales isnderlying Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick would not be equally compelling in all cases. 64 Never-
theless, adhering to the rules announced in those cases, even in circumstances in
which the policy justifications were weaker, was preferable to having courts at-
tempt to "'carve out exceptions to the [direct purchaser] rule for particular
types of markets.' "65 Allowing the latter would "'inject the same "massive
evidence and complicated theories" into treble-damages proceedings"' as courts
tried to determine which industry groups qualified and which did not.66
The states' attorneys general also had argued that the utilities' one hundred
percent pass-through provisions brought them within the cost-plus exception 67
mentioned in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.68 The Court concluded, how-
ever, that the facts in Utilicorp were not within that exception:
The respondent did not sell the gas to its customers under a pre-
existing cost-plus contract. Even if we were to create an exception for
situations that merely resemble those governed by such a contract, we
would not apply the exception here. ... The utility customers made
no commitment to purchase any particular quantity of gas, and the
utility itself had no guarantee of any particular profit.69
The petitioners' final argument was that section 4C of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197670 gave states the right to sue on
59. Id. (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203, 208 (7th
Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914,949-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
60. Id. at 2816.
61. Id. at 2817.
62. Id. at 2816-17. The federal parens patriae statute is 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988). For a
discussion of this statute, see infra text accompanying notes 136-43.
63. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2816.
64. Id. at 2817. For a discussion of the policy rationales underlying the standing limitation, see
supra text accompanying note 9, and infra text accompanying notes 102-10.
65. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2817 (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744
(1977)).
66. Id. (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745).
67. See supra note 31.
68. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2817. This same assertion formed the basis for the Seventh Circuit's
en banc holding in Panhandle Eastern. See supra text accompanying notes 30-3 1; infra text accom-
panying notes 118-28.
69. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988); see infra text accompanying note 137.
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behalf of consumers even in situations in which the consumers themselves, as
indirect purchasers, would not have standing to sue.71 The Court rejected this
assertion, stating that section 4C merely "'created a new procedural device.,.
to enforce existing rights of recovery under § 4 [of the Clayton Act].'" 72 The
statute did not create standing for states' attorneys general to bring parens pa-
triae actions on behalf of persons who themselves lacked standing to assert anti-
trust claims.73
Justice White, joined by three members of the Court, dissented.74 White
claimed that the majority's adherence to direct purchaser standing contravened
the "plain language" of section four, which Congress had enacted to ensure that
"victims of anticompetitive conduct receive compensation." 75 Although ac-
knowledging that Illinois Brick had denied standing to indirect purchasers,
White distinguished the facts in that case from the Utilicorp situation, noting
that the participants in Illinois Brick operated in competitive markets but the
direct purchasers in Utilicorp were regulated monopolies. 76
Justice White also criticized the majority for engaging in "what amounts to
a fact-finding mission" as to whether the utilities passed on the entire over-
charge.77 Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit had assumed a complete
pass-through; therefore, White argued, tlfe Court should have done the same.78
The dissent considered the majority's concern over apportionment un-
founded in this context. 79 The apportionment problem in Illinois Brick arose
from the complexity involved in determining the portion of the overcharge
borne by the direct and indirect purchasers.80 But in Utilicorp, the utilities were
permitted to pass on all of the overcharge to their customers, thus obviating any
need for apportionment.8 1 Justice White stated that it would be "fanciful, at
least unrealistic, to think that a utility entitled to pass on to its customers the
cost of gas that it has purchased will not do so to the maximum extent permitted
by law."'8 2
The dissent next took issue with the majority's claim that restricting stand-
ing to the utilities would enhance enforcement.8 3 Indirect purchasers, contrary
to the Court's assertion, would discover easily the antitrust violation as the price
71. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
72. Id. (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977)).
73. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.
74. 110 S. Ct. at 2818 (White, J., dissenting). Joining the dissent were Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun. It is interesting to find Justice White leading the dissent here; he wrote the
majority opinions in both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.
75. Id. at 2818-19 (White, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2819 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 2820 (White, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (White, J., dissenting) Justice White also dismissed the majority's concerns over lag
period losses as unlikely and "speculative." Id. at 2821 n.* (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2820 (White, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
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increases would appear in their utility bills.8 4 Conversely, argued Justice White,
the majority overstated the utilities' incentives to sue.8 5 He claimed that treble
damages would be calculated only on the basis of the utilities' lost sales, not on
the amount of the overcharge, since they had passed on that cost to their cus-
tomers.8 6 Moreover, the Court engaged in mere speculation by asserting that a
state regulatory commission would allow the utility to keep a portion of any
recovery.8 7 No precedent existed for such an assertion. 8
Lastly, the dissent claimed that the majority's concern over possible multi-
ple liability was unfounded.8 9 As no apportionment problem existed here, there
was no chance that the defendant would end up paying overlapping damages to
direct and indirect purchasers. 90
One can trace the roots of the direct purchaser rule back to the early part of
this century. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co.9 1 the plain-
tiff, a shipper of goods, brought suit against a railroad, claiming that it had
charged unreasonably high rates.92 The defendant alleged that, because the
plaintiffs were able to pass on the overcharge, they could not claim damages and
thus had no cause of action.93 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, rejected
this argument, stating:
The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to
go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences
to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has
suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the ver-
dict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of the
law and it does not inquire into later events.... The carrier ought not
to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one who can take
it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from
whom the carrier took the sum.... Probably in the end the public
pays the damages in most cases of compensated torts.94
It was in two more recent cases, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin-
ery Corp.95 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.,96 however, that the Court clearly
enunciated its stance regarding the standing of direct and indirect purchasers.
In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff shoe company brought suit under section four of
84. Id. at 2820-21 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cites no authority for this claim. Indeed, it seems
odd that a direct purchaser would be able to recover three-fold only for lost profits. Since, under
Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers cannot sue for the overcharge, this would mean that nobody can
recover this amount from the wrongdoer. This result seems antithetical to the antitrust laws' deter-
rence goal.
87. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2821 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
91. 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
92. Id. at 533.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted).
95. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
96. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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the Clayton Act against United, a manufacturer of shoe machinery, claiming
that United was monopolizing the shoe machinery industry by refusing to sell its
equipment, requiring users to lease it instead.97 United contended that Hanover
had suffered no cognizable injury because it had passed on the illegal overcharge
to its customers.98 The Court rejected this pass-on defense, stating that enter-
taining such a claim would raise difficult issues of proving the amount of the
overcharge passed on and determining whether, absent any overcharge, the
plaintiff could have raised its prices.99 The Court also expressed concern that
the ultimate buyers would have only a minuscule personal stake in a lawsuit and
thus would be unwilling to endure the inconveniences of litigation. 1°° This
would diminish private enforcement and increase the likelihood that those guilty
of breaking the antitrust laws would escape liability.101
Nine years later, the Court in Illinois Brick was faced with a different ap-
plication of the pass-on theory. Illinois Brick involved a suit brought by the
State of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities against a group of concrete
block manufacturers, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section
one of the Sherman Act.102 Masonry contractors had purchased the allegedly
overpriced blocks from the conspirators and had resold them to general contrac-
tors. The general contractors then used these blocks in state projects.10 3 Illinois
claimed that part or all of the overcharge had been passed through the chain of
distribution and, as a result, the state had paid three million dollars in excess
charges for the overpriced blocks."14 The Court dismissed the claim, holding
that indirect purchasers may not sue for antitrust damages. 10 Because Hanover
Shoe disallowed defensive use of a pass-on theory by a defendant, 10 6 the Court in
Illinois Brick felt obligated to prohibit offensive use of the pass-on doctrine by
plaintiffs.107 To permit the latter while disallowing the former would create a
risk of multiple liability: "A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially
increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications-and therefore of unwar-
ranted multiple liability for the defendant-by presuming that one plaintiff (the
direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defendant from
97. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483, 488-89.
98. Id. at 487-88.
99. Id. at 489-94.
100. Id. at 494.
101. Id.
102. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. Section 1 of the Sherman act provides, in relevant part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
103. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. at 736.
106. "Defensive use" of the pass-on theory refers to a situation such as the one presented in
Hanover Shoe: a defendant claims that the plaintiff, who is a direct purchaser, should have her claim
dismissed because she has passed on all of the overcharge to her customers. "Offensive use" refers to
situations like that in Illinois Brick: a plaintiff who is an indirect purchaser tries to establish stand-
ing by claiming that part or all of an illegal overcharge has been passed on to him.
107. 431 U.S. at 730. The Court also discussed the option of abandoning the Hanover Shoe rule
as an alternative to denying standing to indirect purchaser plaintiffs. Id. at 729. The Court refused
to take this option, however. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 112.
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using that presumption against the other plaintiff .... 10 8o
The Illinois Brick Court also reiterated the concern expressed in Hanover
Shoe that uncertainties and difficulties inherent in analyzing price and output
decisions made by companies would cause confusion and lead to judicial ineffi-
ciency.109 Allowing multiple parties from remote links in the distribution chain
to join a suit would transform section four actions into massive multi-party pro-
ceedings, requiring the courts to trace the effects of the overcharge through each
step of the distribution chain. 110
The Court noted that Congress, if it disagreed with the Court's use of the
pass-on rule, was free to legislate an alternative interpretation."' Absent con-
gressional action, however, the Illinois Brick Court was unwilling to overrule
Hanover Shoe, noting that eight justices had voted with the majority in that case,
and that concerns of stare decisis weighed heavily in the area of statutory con-
struction. The Court stated, "This presumption of adherence to our prior deci-
sions construing legislative enactments would support our reaffirmance of the
Hanover Shoe construction of § 4 ... even if the Court were persuaded that the
use of pass-on theories by plaintiffs and defendants... is more consistent with
the policies underlying the treble-damages actions than is the Hanover Shoe
rule." 112
The Court mentioned two possible exceptions to the direct purchaser limi-
tation. The first, initially announced in Hanover Shoe, would confer standing on
an indirect purchaser when the direct purchaser has passed on the entire over-
charge with a pre-existing cost-plus contract for a fixed quantity. 113 The ration-
ale underlying this exception is that the fixed-volume term in the contract
furnishes ready proof that the direct purchaser suffered no damage. 1 4 The sec-
ond situation in which indirect purchaser standing may be permitted arises when
the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer. 115 In these in-
stances, the indirect purchaser is, in a sense, also the direct purchaser.
Following the Illinois Brick decision, lower courts struggled to define the
scope of the cost-plus exception. While some felt it applied only -to actual cost-
plus contracts with fixed-quantity requirements, 116 a few courts were willing to
expand its application to situations that were mere "functional equivalents." 117
108. 431 U.S. at 730.
109. Id. at 732-33.
110. Id. at 737.
111. Id. at 736. In fact, there have been numerous congressional attempts, all unsuccessful, to'
change the standing rules adopted by the Court. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
112. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736-37.
113. See id. at 735-36; Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494. For an explanation of the cost-plus excep-
tion, see supra note 31.
114. llinios Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
115. See id, at 736 n.16.
116. See, e.g., Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied,
455 U.S. 941 (1982); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 633 n.4 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); Midwest Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573, 577 n.9, 580 (3d Cir. 1979); Abbotts Dairies Div. of Fairmont Foods, Inc. v. Butz, 584 F.2d 12,
17 n. 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1978); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 898 (7th
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In Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,' 18 the State of
Illinois brought suit on behalf of all customers of Central Illinois Light Com-
pany (CILCO) against Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, alleging that it
had inflated illegally the price of gas sold to CILCO. 119 A provision in CILCO's
contract mandated a one hundred percent pass-through of all cost increases to
its residential customers.1 20 The Seventh Circuit originally dismissed the claim,
holding it barred under Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.'2 1 The court subse-
quently withdrew the opinion and granted rehearing. Sitting en banc, the Sev-
enth Circuit partially reversed its earlier ruling and held that the State did have
standing as an indirect purchaser under the cost-plus exception.1 22 Judge Pos-
ner, writing for a plurality, stated that the facts in Panhandle Eastern were far
removed from those in Illinois Brick, claiming that "[tihe Supreme Court has
never adverted to the issue involved in the present case."' 123 He further asserted
that no apportionment problem existed in Panhandle Eastern because the direct
purchaser (CILCO) and the indirect purchasers (CILCO's residential customers
represented by the State) suffered different types of damage. 124 Specifically,
CILCO incurred lost profits from the reduced sales volume caused by the price
rise while residents bore the entirety of the overcharge. 125 Because there was no
overlap in damages claimed, each party could pursue its own discrete recovery.
The combination of cost-plus pricing 126 and ease of apportionment led Judge
Posner to hold that the residential consumers fell within the cost-plus excep-
tion. 12 7 Although admitting that there was no actual fixed-quantity requirement
present, Posner claimed that such a literal application of Illinois Brick would be
inappropriate here given the difference in fact situations. 128 Ease of differentiat-
ing CILCO's lost sales damages from the residential consumers' overcharge
damages provided a valid surrogate to a fixed-quantity contract. 129
The United States Supreme Court in Utilicorp rejected the Seventh Circuit's
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148,
1163-64 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). The phrase "functional equivalent" refers
to a situation in which the direct and indirect purchasers are not parties to an actual pre.existing
cost-plus contract, but are in circumstances that make it easy for the indirect purchaser to demon-
strate that the direct purchaser passed on the entire amount of any overcharge and suffered no
diminution in sales volume as a result of the wrongful activity. See Comment, supra note 31, at 756-
64 (discussing the differing lower court approaches to functional equivalence).
118. 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988).
119. Id. at 892.
120. Id. at 894.
121. Illinois ex rel Hartigan v. Panhandle E., 839 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
upon rehearing, 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 543 (1988). For a discus-
sion of the original holding in this case (before its withdrawal), see supra text accompanying notes
23-25.
122. Panhandle E., 852 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra note 31 for a discussion of the
cost-plus exception.
123. 852 F.2d at 893.
124. Id. at 896.
125. Id. at 897.
126. Utilities set rates by adding together all allowed costs and a preset return on capital. Ham-
mond, supra note 30, at 45-46.
127. Panhandle E., 852 F.2d at 895.
128. Id. at 893.
129. Id. at 895.
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use of the cost-plus exception 130 and clarified somewhat the conditions neces-
sary to assert this doctrine. The Court held that a situation in which a direct
purchaser's only damage arises from lost sales volume, as was the case in Pan-
handle Eastern, does not qualify as a valid cost-plus exception. 131 Rather, the
Court stated that to qualify, the indirect purchasers must demonstrate that the
direct purchaser has not suffered injury of any kind whatsoever: "we might al-
low indirect purchasers to sue only when, by hypothesis, the direct purchaser
will bear no portion of the overcharge and otherwise suffer no injury. "1 32 More-
over, the indirect purchaser must be able to demonstrate this absence of injury
without resort to complex economic or market analysis.' 33 It is difficult to envi-
sion a situation other than an actual fixed-quantity cost-plus contract that would
meet these strict requirements. Nonetheless, the Court did leave open the possi-
bility of allowing the exception in circumstances "that merely resemble those
governed by such a contract." 134 The Utilicorp Court also refused to state defin-
itively that it would recognize a cost-plus exception, choosing instead to repeat
the equivocal language used in previous opinions--that indirect purchasers
"might" have standing in these circumstances.' 35 Thus, while the Utilicorp
holding clarifies somewhat the parameters for the cost-plus contract exception, it
fails to clarify whether or not it exists in the first place.
The Utilicorp Court also delineated its interpretation of section 4C of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.136 This statute reads,
in relevant part:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of
such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State, in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section
for injury sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason
of any violation of [the Sherman Act].' 37
The Court held that states could not represent anyone in aparenspatriae capac-
ity unless that person would have had standing to sue in an individual capac-
ity.138 This interpretation of section 4C seems contrary to the aims of its
congressional proponents, who intended that the statute enable states' attorneys
general to sue on behalf of consumers, be they direct or indirect purchasers. 139
130. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2811.
131. Id. at 2817.
132. Id. at 2818 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2817.
135. Id.; see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 ('IThis Court in Hanover Shoe indicated the
narrow scope it intended for any exception to its rule barring pass-on defenses by citing, as the only
example of a situation where the defense might be permitted, a pre-existing cost-plus contract.");
Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 ("IT]here might be situations-for instance, when an overcharged
buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been
damaged-where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted...
would not be present.").
136. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1988).
138. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
139. See, eg., 122 CONG. Rac. 30878 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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Soon after passage of this legislation, however, the Supreme Court held in Illi-
nois Brick that indirect purchasers had no standing to sue. 140 This caused much
consternation among supporters of a broader interpretation of section 4C includ-
ing Justice Brennan, who claimed, in his dissenting opinion to Illinois Brick, that
"[t]oday's decision flouts Congress' purpose and severely undermines the effec-
tiveness of the private treble-damages action as an instrument of antitrust en-
forcement." 141 Members of Congress have held numerous hearings on proposed
legislation to overturn or limit the rule.142 Thus far, however, none of these
proposals has been enacted into law.
In spite of Illinois Brick, some thought that states might still be given stand-
ing to sue under section 4C on behalf of consumers who were indirect purchas-
ers, even though such persons could not sue in an individual capacity. 143 The
Utilicorp Court ended this speculation, holding that section 4C merely created a
new procedural device to enforce existing rights; it did not create standing where
none had previously existed. 144
The Utilicorp case is also significant for its application of the direct pur-
chaser standing limitation, for the first time, to a regulated industry. 145 This
holding should quell any notions that the rules set forth in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick were limited to selected industries or markets; 146 the majority was
adamant in its belief that attempting to exempt certain industries would be "an
unwarranted and counterproductive exercise." 147
[Rlecoveries are authorized by the compromise bill whether or not the consumers
purchased directly from the price fixer, or indirectly, from intermediaries, retailers, or
other middlemen. The technical and procedural argument that consumers have no "stand-
ing" whenever they are not "in privity" with the price fixer, and have not purchased di-
rectly from him, is rejected by the compromise bill.
Id
140. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36.
141. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. See The Antitrust Remedies Improvement Act and the Intellectual Property Reform Act of
1987: Hearings on S. 1407 and S. 635 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong,. 1st & 2d Sess. 1-298 (1987-88); The Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1986 (Illinois Brick): Hearing of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2481, 99th
Cong,. 2d Sess. 1-119 (1986); Antitrust Fairness Amendments of 1983 and Oversight of Corporate
Interlocks: Hearing on HR. 2244 and Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong,. 2d Sess. 1-152 (1984); The Taxpayer
Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1983 (Illinois Brick): Hearings on S. 915 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-237 (1983); Restoring Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2060 and 2204 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-333 (1979); Fair and Effective Enforce-
ment of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sss. 1-203 (1978); Effective Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 8359 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sss. 4-231 (1977).
143. See Brief for the Petitioners at 23-27, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct, 2807
(1990) (No. 88-2109); Note, Parens Patriae Actions on Behalf of Indirect Purchasers: Do They Sur-
vive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASINGs L.J. 179, 191 (1982).
144. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2818.
145. Id. at 2812.
146. This was one of the petitioners' arguments in Utilicorp. See Brief for the Petitioners at 10,
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990) (No. 88-2109).
147. Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2817.
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Although the wide applicability of the direct purchaser limitation can no
longer be in doubt, much controversy over the wisdom of the rule remains. 148
To evaluate the Court's holding in Utilicorp, one should analyze its likely effect
on the underlying goals of private antitrust enforcement: deterring future viola-
tions, compensating victims, and forcing disgorgement of illegal profits.' 49 Fo-
cusing first on compensation, an ideal resolution in the present context would be
one that fully reimburses consumers for that portion of the overcharge borne by
them and the utilities for any lost sales caused by having to raise their prices in
reaction to a supplier's illegal behavior (as well as any portion of the overcharge
not passed on to consumers). The Utilicorp Court's holding, at first glance,
seems to reward unduly the utilities by allowing them to recover the entire treble
amount, including the portion allocable to the overcharge, while denying the
consumers any recovery whatsoever. The Court justifies this outcome by pre-
dicting that a state regulatory commission most likely would force the utility to
remit at least part of any damage award to its customers, presumably in the form
of lower rates. 150 In support of this proposition, the Court cites a lone case
decided by the Louisiana Public Service Commission, In re Petition of LP & L
for Order Relating to Disposition of Proceeds Against Gas Supplier.151 The dam-
ages in LP & L 152 resulted from a breach of contract action rather than an
antitrust claim.1 53 Nevertheless, the Commission mandated that the utility flow
the proceeds back to its customers by reducing its rates over a five-year pe-
riod.1 54 Outside of this example, however, there is scant precedent, either for or
against, the Court's assertion that utilities would have to disgorge part of any
treble award.
Whether the Utiicorp holding furthers or hinders the compensatory aims of
section four of the Clayton Act essentially turns on how a state regulatory com-
mission decides to allocate the damage award. If it orders a refund to consumers
equal to the amount of the overcharge borne by them, then an almost ideal
solution is achieved: nearly all injured parties would receive compensation. 155
Conversely, if the regulators permitted a utility to keep the entire award, or
instead required it to remit the entire amount to its customers, then some parties
remain uncompensated while others received an award greatly in excess of any
damage suffered. Because the first alternative yields a plainly superior result,
and because regulators tend to seek outcomes that balance conflicting claims and
148. See supra note 10 (citing commentary).
149. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
150. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2815.
151. In re: Petition of LP & L for Order Relating to Disposition of Proceeds Against Gas Sup-
plier, Nos. U-17906, U-12636, U-17649 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 1, 1989) (LEXIS, UTILTY
library, LaPUC file).
152. "LP & L" is an abbreviation for "Louisiana Power and Light Company."
153. LP & L, at 26.
154. Id. at 31-32.
155. The compensation scheme would be imperfect, even in this scenario. Some customers who
paid the overcharge will have moved out of the area before the rate reduction goes into effect, thus
forfeiting their portion of compensation. Also, persons who move into the utility's service area after
the violation is discovered and enjoined will reap the benefits of lower utility prices without having
paid the previous overcharge.
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minimize harm to any one group, 156 they most likely would choose it over the
latter, more one-sided alternatives.
If, rather than limiting standing to direct purchasers, the Utihicorp Court
had allowed the states to sue on behalf of the indirect purchasers, then a court,
rather than a regulatory commission, would have borne the responsibility for
allocating the recovery among the various plaintiffs. This introduces the difficul-
ties discussed by the Utilicorp Court, such as apportionment and multiplicity of
parties. The petitioners in Utilicorp argued that no apportionment difficulties
would arise; states would collect for the overcharge while the utilities would
recover for lost profits from lower sales. 157 The problem with this scenario is
that one cannot assume a total pass-through. Not all utilities operate under
automatic price-adjustment agreements. Utilicorp's Kansas Public Service oper-
ation, for example, was not subject to a flow-through mechanism until 1987.158
Companies without these provisions would have to petition the regulatory
agency for a rate hike to offset the cost increase caused by the antitrust violation.
This typically is a cumbersome process. As Professor Navarro notes:
The rate-making process is far from instantaneous. For a utility to
raise its rates, it must first make a formal request, which is handled
through courtlike proceedings. The time between the filing for a rate
hike and actually having it granted is the lag time.... When regula-
tory lag is long-as it is in many states-the utility loses out on the
potential earnings during the rate-setting process. 159
On top of the lag period costs, there is no guarantee that the commission would
allow a rate hike. Regulators have broad discretion in these matters and, de-
pending on the political climate and the ideological makeup of the commission,
may decide to deny the request. 6°
Even utilities that are subject to price-adjustment mechanisms may have to
bear part of the overcharge damage; some regulatory schemes now use "partial
pass-through" clauses, which require utilities to absorb a percentage of any fuel-
cost increase.1 61 The rationale behind these provisions is that forcing the utility
to bear part of a cost increase will encourage it to operate prudently and effi-
ciently. 162 Several states have adopted this incentive-based methodology while
others have rejected it. 163 The implications of this development for utility cus-
156. Hammond, supra note 30, at 40.
157. Distributing the award to consumers may be more difficult in this situation. A regulatory
commission would seem to be better situated to distribute the award to consumers than a court
because the regulators can make use of the utilities' existing customer billing systems to channel
funds to the rightful beneficiaries.
158. Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 6 n.5, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807
(1990) (No. 88-2109).
159. Navarro, The Performance of Utility Commissions, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 337, 339 (J. Moorhouse ed. 1986).
160. Id.
161. See, eg., In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., (NY PSC 1983) 56 PUR 4th 315; see also
Partial Passthrough (Incentive) Fuel Clauses, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 8, 1985, at 52 (detailing the
increasing use of partial pass-through provisions) [hereinafter Partial Passthrough].
162. Partial Passthrough, supra note 161, at 52.
163. Id.
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tomers seeking standing as indirect purchasers are serious: contrary to the as-
sertions of the petitioners in Utilicorp, one cannot safely assume that a given
utility will be able to pass on one hundred percent of an illegal overcharge. In-
stead, an investigation into state regulatory law may be required to determine if
the utility is subject to an automatic adjustment provision and, if so, the amount
of pass-on permitted. The court also would have to evaluate detailed cost data
and financial computations to ascertain losses during periods of regulatory lag.
It seems unnecessary to burden courts with these issues in an effort to compen-
sate consumers; as stated before, a utility commission most likely would order a
refund to customers for the amount of the overcharge borne by them. True, the
commissioners would have to delve into regulatory law and perform the same
financial calculations that a court otherwise would be faced with, but commis-
sions are much more knowledgeable in this arcane area than most judges and
could dispose of the task with greater efficiency and expertise. In sum, allowing
indirect purchasers standing to sue in a Utilicorp-type setting would not improve
their chances of ultimately receiving compensation for bearing their portion of
an illegal overcharge.
A second major objective of allowing private actions under section four is
deterrence of future violations. From this standpoint, an ideal outcome would
provide a potential financial reward sufficient to encourage parties to endure the
difficulties and inconveniences of protracted litigation, and discourage would-be
offenders from breaking the law in the first place. The Illinois Brick standing
limitation essentially places all the deterrence eggs in one basket: if the direct
purchaser(s) should fail to bring suit, then the transgression will go unpunished.
Therefore, the rule is sensible only if direct purchasers have adequate incentives
to pursue claims. When the direct purchaser is a regulated utility, the incentive
may not be as strong as if it were in a competitive industry; the utility in most
instances will have passed on much of the overcharge; it may be reluctant to
upset long-standing personal relationships that have developed between it and its
supplier; and, if it recovers damages, it probably would have to share the award
with its customers. To support its assertion that adequate incentives do exist in
a regulatory context, the Utilicorp Court again found itself speculating as to how
state regulators would act. The majority claimed that a commission probably
would disallow a utility's request for a rate increase if it avoided bringing suit
and that the threat of this occurrence would encourage the utility to pursue
claims. 164 A commission, however, may not be aware of the illegal activity and,
in any case, may be somewhat reluctant to penalize a utility for mere inaction.
Moreover, if the utility is subject to an automatic price adjustment mechanism,
it could offset the overcharge through higher rates without seeking the regula-
tors' approval, although the commission presumably could get its pound of flesh
from the misbehaving utility at the next formal rate hearing. Overall, the threat
of regulatory retribution may or may not provide a compelling incentive for a
utility to pursue antitrust claims.
Besides the "stick" of a possible regulatory refusal of an offsetting rate in-
164. See Utilicorp, 110 S. Ct. at 2816.
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crease, a significant "carrot" awaits a utility should litigation be pursued to a
successful conclusion. Apart from three-fold damages for lost profits caused by
lower sales, the utility might get to keep a sizable chunk of the portion of the
treble award based on the overcharge. Even if, as the majority in Utilicorp
predicts, 165 a regulatory commission requires the utility to flow back to its cus-
tomers the full amount of any damages they suffered, two-thirds of the treble
recovery from the overcharge would remain. A commission should allow the
utility to keep some or all of this amount as compensation for incurring the
difficulties and inconveniences of litigation.166
A further incentive should be considered. Utilities have an interest in pro-
tecting their markets. Many large industrial customers will have access to alter-
native sources of energy available and might switch if a utility's prices cease to
be competitive with available alternatives. This could result in a substantial and
possibly permanent loss in the utility's market share. A utility facing this poten-
tial competition would be unlikely to ignore an overcharge even if a one hundred
percent pass-through were available. As the respondents in Utilicorp noted,
"Customers who believe that the utility is looking out for their interests are
more likely to defer seeking permanent alternative sources of energy."167
If states had been permitted to bring parens patriae claims, they too would
have had a strong incentive to do so, at least when the anticompetitive behavior
affected large segments of the general public. Litigation would engender a high
degree of visibility and publicity for the attorneys general, who are, after all,
politicians. Not all commentators agree on the efficacy of such actions, however.
Professor (now Judge) Posner has expressed concern that the political character
of parens patriae makes it an unreliable tool for antitrust enforcement:
There may well be a tendency under parens patriae for state attorneys
general to bring headline-grabbing, scapegoat-seeking suits against po-
litically unpopular corporations, with little regard for the intrinsic an-
titrust merit of the suit and with little effort to press the suit to a
successful conclusion. By the time the case is ready for trial, the state
attorney general's office may be occupied by a new politician with little
165. See id. at 2814-15.
166. To illustrate, assume that U, a utility, sues its gas supplier S for antitrust violations. U
claims that S conspired illegally to raise the price of its fuel and that U thus incurred $800,000 in
excess costs because of the overcharge. For simplicity's sake, assume that U passed on this entire
amount to its customers. As a result, U's customers purchased less gas, costing U $200,000 in lost
profits. If U sues for the entire loss of $1 million ($800,000 in overcharges and $200,000 in lost
profits) and wins, trebling will result in a final award of $3 million, of which $2.4 million ($800,000
times 3) is allocable to the overcharge, and $600,000 ($200,000 times 3) is allocable to the utility's
lost profits. If regulators ordered all of the recovery traceable to the overcharge to be passed on, the
customers would receive a windfall of $2.4 million ($1.6 million more than their actual damages)
while the utility, which bore the risks and burdens of litigation, is left with only 20% of the award.
This outcome may deter utilities from bothering to bring antitrust claims in the future. Alterna-
tively, if regulators mandated a flow-through of only $800,000 to the consumers, which is the actual
amount of damage they incurred, then the utilities would be left with a much more substantial
recovery of $2.2 million. Note that this amount includes two-thirds of the portion allocable to the
overcharge as well as all of the recovery allocable to lost sales. Regulators also could choose to split
the difference between these two examples in any manner they wished.
167. Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United, Inc. at 20, Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Ina, 110 S.
Ct. 2807 (1990) (No. 88-2109).
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interest in carrying out the projects of his predecessor.168
Permitting parens patriae actions on behalf of indirect purchasers could
have an adverse impact on section four's deterrent effect. Injured parties not
represented by the states would, for the most part, fail to join the action because
their stake in the lawsuit would be nominal. This would reduce the aggregate
amount of the damage recovery, thus lowering the cost of illegal behavior to the
wrongdoers. Also, dividing the damage claims among plaintiffs at the outset
will reduce the portion of the damages the utility may seek, thereby reducing its
incentive to pursue the claim. As the number of potential plaintiffs grows, so
grows the possibility that the potential recovery to each individual plaintiff will
be insufficient to entice any of them into bringing an action.
Limiting standing to a regulated utility that has passed on most or all of the
overcharge to its customers is, all in all, an appropriate policy choice as it offers
the best chance of compensating the greatest number of victims while at the
same time providing adequate incentives for putative plaintiffs to pursue claims
vigorously. Allowing indirect purchasers to join the suit would lead to greater
complexity, multiplicity of parties, and higher costs, and would necessitate prob-
ing the intricacies of state regulatory law and the subtleties of sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis in order to apportion damages among the various plaintiffs.
Applying the Illinois Brick standing limitation to a regulated direct purchaser
best advances the laws' compensatory and deterrence goals while providing a
prudent, if controversial, check against what might otherwise become un-
manageably complex litigation.
LEE J. POTTER
168. Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing, supra note 10, at 613.
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